In October 2001, the United States and its NATO allies
invaded Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban, sent Al Qaeda in disarray and
established a largely pro-Western government. There was a lot of promise at the
time that Afghanistan would become a peaceful, democratic and stable nation
within a couple of years.
Eight years later, with over 100,000 NATO troops and
billions of dollars spent on security and reconstruction, the Taliban are
resurgent, the government grossly corrupt, elections openly rigged and the
narcotics trade (which the Taliban had curbed) is booming again. The failure to
establish an effective state is so acute that the president of Afghanistan,
Hamid Karzai, rules as nothing more than a mayor of the capital city Kabul ‘
his control of which is also tenuous.
The US mistook the tactical advantage Al Qaeda had on 9/11
(having sanctuary in Afghanistan) for a strategic advantage. It has thus spent
billions of dollars in a vain effort to rebuild that country’s security
services and economy. Yet Al Qaeda’s strategic advantage lay in exploiting
weaknesses in US security arrangements: so terrorists were able to move money,
train as pilots in US flying schools and use American planes as missiles. The
planning could as well have been done in a cave. By closing these loopholes,
the US rendered another 9/11 impossible, even if terrorists had a sanctuary.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the US
programme of assistance to Afghanistan ‘ intended to stabilise and strengthen
Afghan economic, social, political and security situation so as ‘to blunt
popular support for extremist forces in the region’ has since 2001,
appropriated US$ 38 billion. If we add on her NATO allies and other donors,
Afghanistan has taken more than US$ 50 billion in foreign military and
development aid. Yet there is little evidence of reduced poverty or increased
state capacity anywhere proportional to the billions spent. Where has all this
money gone?
Afghanistan is a classic example of the failures inherent in
international intervention in poor countries to build states, establish
security and foster development. The most sophisticated exponent of
intervention is Oxford’s Prof. Paul Collier. In his view, security anywhere is
an international public good: rich countries should take it upon themselves to
provide it in warring poor countries. To Collier, people in the ‘bottom
billion’ have no capacity for initiative or self-correction and therefore need
a new form of colonialism. (The word ‘colonialism’ is mine, not his but it
reflects the essence of of proposals in his two most recent books).
Like the colonialists of old (David Livingstone for example)
who presented their mission as one of ending slavery and spreading Christianity
and ‘civilisation’, the new colonialists present their work in humanitarian
language ‘ to bring peace, development and effective states to the poor. Some,
like Collier, take this too far; the aim of the new colonial project is not so
much to improve the lives of the people in the bottom billion as it is to
ensure that his son does not grow up seeing poverty and violence on TV. That is
what we are now: a despicable sight ‘ or to use Tony Blair’s words a ‘scar on
the conscience of the world.’
But fate is a great joker, my father used to tell me, it
always laughs last. As US President Barack Obama won a Nobel Peace Prize, he
was discussing with his advisors the possibility of sending an extra 40,000 US
troops to Afghanistan. How come the most powerful military alliance in the
world made up of the richest economies has failed to defeat the poorly armed,
poorly trained and certainly poorly resourced Taliban?
Policy options for poor countries are constrained by the
ideological hegemony of the West and its pressure groups ‘ the secular
missionaries of foreign aid, self-appointed human rights defenders and apostles
of humanitarianism. Often their arguments are well intentioned and sound
logical and convincing. But upon rigorous scrutiny, they are misleading
rhetoric detached from the reality of the complexity of the problem under
discussion. Sadly, a large section of elites in the ‘bottom billion’ sing this
chorus.
After eight years of failure, it should be obvious that no
amount of NATO troop presence and Western financial assistance will build an
effective state in Afghanistan. This is because financial and military aid per
se is not the solution to weak state capacity. The development of a
country cannot be engineered from outside. The solutions have to grow
organically from within the society. To allow the growth of an internal Afghan
solution, the US and allies need to make some difficult choices and tradeoffs.
First, they need to abandon moralising about democracy and
accountable government; you cannot have that in anarchy. The most immediate
challenge for Afghanistan is to build an effective state. It does not matter
whether this is realised through a democratic bargain or a military victory by
one group. That would be determined by the outplay of internal struggles within
Afghan society. The best way to begin this process is to create space for
Afghans to find a solution.
The US and her allies should begin scaling down their
military and financial commitment to the Karzai government. This will allow it
to either adjust its capability to meet the threat or to collapse. Whatever
happens, different groups within Afghanistan will seek to wrestle for control
of the state. The short term humanitarian costs will be high, but the long term
results will be an effective state and a durable peace. Let the group with the
organisational ability to raise resources, build an army and impose its will on
others control the state.
By closely watching the contest for supremacy, the US and
her allies can open covert or overt dialogue with the group that exhibits
superior organisational ability ‘ a capacity to cajole, bribe or coarse other
groups. They can then bribe such a group with financial and military assistance
in exchange for a deal not to give Al Qaeda sanctuary. Aid would be going to an
effective local warlord, not an ineffective foreign-imposed puppet. The world
is better with the Taliban in control of the state and therefore subject to
sanctions and bombings than to have them as fugitives hiding in caves.
amwenda@independent.co.ug
No comments:
Post a Comment