The
decision on whether Kagame stays or retires may be in the hands of
international organisations
The fortunes
of a nation, especially a poor one, are determined not only by its leaders and
people but also by the interests and whims of powerful nations. This fact hung
over the meeting of the National Executive Council (NEC) meeting of Rwanda’s
ruling party, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) on February 8, 2012 (see cover
story). As President Paul Kagame began his speech on his desire to relinquish
the presidency, many RPF cadres were having second thoughts about the whole
idea.
Kagame plans
to retire in 2017 for a number of reasons. He has said he needs a break –
having made his contribution, he needs to rest. He has also told me severally
that he believes the country has come a long way and that he has played his
part. It is time for him now to hand over to the next generation of leaders.
The issue in Rwanda is not “who” succeeds Kagame. Rather it is about “how” the
RPF organises succession i.e. the process through which his successor is
identified and selected.
Kagame
appreciates that individuals can make things happen but institutions make
things last. Throughout his presidency, he has tried his best to build
institutions – both of the party and the state with a high degree of success.
For example, today, the RPF as an organisation is institutionally strong with
many individuals of leadership capability to succeed Kagame. That is why it is
important to establish a credible and transparent succession mechanism that
ensures that there is change with continuity.
Yet Kagame
and the RPF need to recognise that institutions take generations to mature. And
even then, they remain susceptible to reversal. A new leader can drag the
country into chaos. Only a blind idealist would think that all Kagame has to do
is leave the presidency and everything will be alright. Such a naïve,
idealistic or even reckless exit would follow him at his farm in Muhazi. He
would soon witness Rwanda go the way of Mali. Therefore, how he leaves and the
structures he leaves in place will have powerful implications on the future of
Rwanda and the stability of this region.
It is always
good to hope for the best but plan for the worst. The president who will
succeed Kagame will lack his clout, moral standing, overwhelming legitimacy and
the respect (and fear) he commands. The first task of such a president will be
to win over powerful individuals and groups. Therefore the first move will be
to trade favours - hence corruption.
The RPF
leadership now has a challenge to ensure that when Kagame leaves, the next
president does not seek to destroy what has been built. In doing this, they may
need to improve their institutions of accountability and control. One such
mechanism – which many in RPF have voiced – is to have a president elected by
the party with a majority in parliament as is done in South Africa. This gives
the ruling party the power to recall a president if his conduct is injurious to
the national interest. Having a president directly elected by the population
for seven years may lock the country in a crisis.
Yet the
decision on whether Kagame stays or retires in 2017 may be out of the hands of
Rwandese and into the hands of international human rights and “humanitarian”
organisations. As they continue to pressure western governments to sanction
Kigali and indict its leaders including Kagame himself, many powerful
individuals in the RPF and the military may begin to see things differently.
They may realise that their future security and immunity lies in retaining
power with Kagame as president. Kagame himself is a human being. If the choice
is staying in power without international criminal prosecution or leaving it
for a life at The Hague, even a fool can see where the dice will fall.
In many ways
therefore the pressures by human rights organisations on Kigali (and other
countries in the developing world) although overtly claiming to promote the
cause of democracy, actually tend to subvert its realisation. By denying
nuance, context and complexity, they take positions that threaten the security
of those in government. Rather than force leaders of developing countries to
improve governance, such pressure tends to force them to put in place measures
to protect their rule from external subversion.
My intuition
tells me that democracies are more susceptible to external manipulation
compared to dictatorships. Electoral competition and free speech create room
for rich foreigners to influence local politics. Thus, to assert their
sovereignty, governments in poor countries, under pressure from human rights
organisations and their home governments, tend to take measures towards
authoritarian control. Thus the most independent-minded governments of poor
countries oft turn out to be authoritarian because a dictatorship is much more
difficult to subvert than a democracy.
For example,
it was easier for the US to subvert the government of Salvador Allende in Chile
(1973) Patrice Lumumba in Congo (1960), Mohamed Mossadegh in Iran (1953) and
Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954) than it could ever be possible with Cuba
under Fidel Castrol or Venezuela under Hugo Chaves. It follows therefore
that repeated attacks on independent-minded governments of poor countries tends
to facilitate an artificial selection that only allows governments that are
authoritarian to survive.
One hopes
that those who care about Rwanda learn this lesson i.e. that the best way to
facilitate the flowering of democracy and peaceful transitions of power in
developing countries is to leave as much space as possible to domestic
political initiative. External interference, even when driven by noble
intentions, has a tendency to becoming counterproductive. The experience of
Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe shows how externally driven attempts towards
regime change, short of a direct military intervention like in Muammar Gadaffi’s
Libya, tends not only to entrench a seating government but more critically, to
push it towards greater repression and economic catastrophe.
No comments:
Post a Comment