Why Uganda’s
large cabinet, numerous presidential advisors and new districts are politically
lucrative
And so it was
that inside the New Vision of Monday July 22 was a printed list of our
ministers – a 78-strong cabinet – up from 71. The biggest “ministry” is the
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).
It has a
prime minister, two deputies, five full cabinet ministers – for Karamoja,
information and national guidance, general duties, disaster preparedness and
refugees and government chief whip. Then it has five ministers of state – for
Luwero, Teso, Bunyoro, Karamoja and northern Uganda. Huh!!!
President
Yoweri Museveni has ruled this country for such a long time because he has a
good intuition about the political pretentions, social needs (for status) and
economic challenges of Uganda’s elites. By expanding the sphere of patronage to
include so many political elites, he has been able to adeptly build a broad
ruling coalition.
The largest
expression of this has been in the creation of new districts. From 33 districts
when he came to power in 1986, Uganda now has 114 districts – most of them
created after the 1996 constitution. Uganda is actually not alone. Only
recently, Kenya had created 254 districts by July 2009 before the High court
declared them illegal. Ghana is the size of Uganda and has 214 districts
serving 25 million people.
Why many
districts? When you create a new district, it creates about 190 new jobs – 150
for the district civil service, 30 for councilors and about ten as the
executive. The average wage bill for a district in Uganda and its municipal or
town council is Shs 600 million – a bonanza for local elites.
New districts
are created ostensibly to “take services closer to the people.” In reality, new
districts reduce the money available for services while increasing that for
patronage. For example, a new district splits the old one yet the staffing does
not change.
So the
government creates a new staff structure to duplicate the one at mother district.
But it does not create a new budget for the new district – it simply splits the
budget for the old district.
Let me
illustrate: in 2010 Bushenyi district was split into five districts. In the
2009/10 financial year, the old Bushenyi had a budget of Shs 1.64 billion for
UPE and Primary healthcare (non-wage) of which Shs214 million was for
administrative costs.
When it was
split, the mother Bushenyi got Shs482 million. Of this, administrative costs
were Shs241 million (due to wage increases). Mitooma district got Shs365
million of which administrative costs were Shs201 million; then Rubirizi got
Shs198 million of which administrative costs were Shs136 million; Sheema got
Shs403 million with administrative costs of
Shs160 million; and Buhweju got Shs175 million of which Shs 126 million
went to administrative expenses.
The total
central government grant to the “region” of the old Bushenyi remained the same.
But the administrative costs now grew from Shs241 million to Shs865 million –
that is money diverted from providing public goods and services to citizens to
paying the salaries of elites – civil servants and politicians – in these
areas.
Theoretically,
in an electoral democracy like ours, voters should reject this arrangement in
favour of services. Yet a study by the London School of Economics found that
whenever a district is created, Museveni’s support increases by 3% in the
mother district and 5% in the new.
So why do
voters make the “wrong” choice – lining the pockets of elites rather than
demanding public goods and services? The masses are mobilised using elites.
These elites use many ingenious tools to win over the local masses – like
claiming that their clan or ethnic group or even village is discriminated
against by the mother district.
Essentially
it is like in the United States where “special interests” have subverted
democracy to serve their ends rather than those of the ordinary voter.
And why do
local elites act so selfishly in disregard to the interests of their voters? It
turns out that actually when a new district is created it brings more money to
the local area. For example, the town where the new district headquarter is
located immediately becomes a Town Council.
With this
status, a new administrative and political structure is created. On average,
this structure gets an unconditional grant of Shs 400 million from the central
government for wages and services. Add this to the new administrative costs of
the new district and you have an average of Shs900 million all of a sudden
being spent in and by the area as both district and town council costs.
All of a
sudden, purchasing power in the new district grows. Restaurants, motels,
salons, fuel stations, car washing bays, barber shops, bars, supermarkets, and
brothels find new patrons in the form of the new district and town council
political and bureaucratic elites.
It also
begins to build a new entrepreneurial class as the politically well connected
now get contracts to rehabilitate roads, renovate health centers and schools
and provide stationary, pens, pencils and other supplies to the district and
town council offices. Land near town that was meant for agriculture now gets
subdivided into plots for new commercial buildings for the town.
A friend who
has studied this trend found that political and bureaucratic wages are the
money that is driving the consumption and hence economic boom in the districts.
When I was
young, intelligent and idealistic, I made ferocious attacks on this growth of
political patronage, focusing largely on its fiscal consequences. Now I have
grown old and stupid but may be more realistic. I have also lost my belief in
the wickedness of politicians.
I had ignored
what I had learnt from Prof. Robert Bates of Harvard University (a man whom I
owe a huge intellectual debt) that what is economically damaging could be (and
often if) politically rewarding.
Uganda’s
expansive political patronage machine may seem fiscally stupid but it is
politically brilliant. In spite of what is being said, we are likely to see
more districts, a larger cabinet, more presidential advisors, and more
semi-autonomous government bodies.
amwenda@independent.co.ug
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