Why parliament will either increase its term of office from five to seven years or raise its wages threefold
Some Members of
Parliament have proposed that their term be extended from five to seven
years. This proposal is going to gain momentum. If it is not adopted by
the current parliament, the next one will. It is almost inevitable that
MPs increase the number of years of an elected term, or double or even
triple their wages. This is because the consolidation of electoral
competition has gone hand in glove with the commercialisation of
politics.
Having been to India,
Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia and Kenya and witnessed first
hand the similarities in the way democratic politics is organised along
similar lines, I am inclined to present this problem as a structural
one. Electoral competition in poor countries tends to increase
corruption and undermine the ability of parliament to exercise oversight
on the executive.
Institutions create
incentives for actors inside them. In Uganda’s case, electoral
competition takes place in the context of a largely poor electorate. The
profile of the median voter in Uganda is that he/she lives in a
corrugated iron-roofed house, with a rammed earth floor, relies on a
kerosene candle for light, firewood for energy, has two poor quality
meals a day, buys clothes twice or thrice a year, eats meat once in a
month, earns $500 in a year, has a wife and seven children and his best
asset is a bicycle.
This profile has
powerful implications on electoral competition. The voter tends to be a
realist looking for immediate material gains from politicians rather
than an idealist seeking reform of governance. He/she would tend to be
attracted more to politicians in a position to meet his/her immediate
needs for security, food and jobs (which can easily be secured by
working through rather than against government) than those who promise
to end corruption and defend human rights.
In a contest between a
crook who has sold his house in Kololo to run for MP and a patriot
committed to improving the quality of governance, the crook has an
advantage. The crook can make similar promises as the patriot to fight
public sector corruption, to build roads, schools and hospitals and to
improve the quality and access to education, healthcare and clean water.
Because these promises are realised at a future date, anyone can make
them even if they intend to do little or nothing. The crook can
supplement such public policy promises by distributing salt, sugar,
alcohol, meat and soap to voters.
Voters are not stupid.
First, they have experience of many public policy promises being made
during campaigns and few being fulfilled. So they have an inbuilt
tendency to be skeptical. Secondly, voters know that the private returns
to individual MPs are higher than the public policy benefits voters
get. Third, they suspect that once elected, the MP is less likely to
return and share his/her benefits with them. So it is better to insist
that the candidate pays for his promises now than later, hence bribery.
Corruption of the electoral process is generated more by demand from
voters than by supply from politicians.
The situation is
different in a developed country like Norway. The median voter earns
$50,000 per year, lives in a good apartment with electricity and running
water and meets all their basic needs even when they are unemployed.
Such a voter may accept bribes from candidates but they would be very
high; may be up to $300,000 per voter. If you multiply this on 30,000
voters, it may be too expensive for most candidates. Therefore, in such
circumstances, it is cheaper to bribe voters with public policy promises
on healthcare and education than with private gifts.
The reverse is true in
poor countries. Because of very low incomes, voters in poor countries
may trade their vote for as little as a kilogram of rice or meat. So
democracy in rich nations would promote public policy and
institutionalisation of the state while doing the actual opposite in
poor countries. But the consequence of this structure of incentives in
poor countries is that more often than not, the crooks defeat the
public-spirited individuals.
This is the experience
we have seen in Uganda: every election has seen the defeat of the more
public-spirited candidates and the victory of crooks who have no qualms
about bribing voters. With time, many public-spirited politicians have
either opted out of electoral competition or become realistic and
thereby began bribing voters as well. Thus, people like Ruhakana
Rugunda, Gerald Sendaula, Mayanja Nkangi, etc progressively quit
electoral politics. A democratic process has produced undemocratic
outcomes.
But if a crooked
politician spends over Shs 500 million to be elected to parliament, they
must find a way to re-coup their investment. They must either lobby to
be appointed to cabinet in the hope that they can have greater access to
public resources. Or they can lobby to sit on influential committees of
parliament so that they can leverage it to force ministers and civil
servants to bribe them. Others will fight for increasing their
allowances and wages, or now argue for extension of their term from five
to seven years, so that they can recoup their investment.
As I write this article
now, 60% of all MPs in Uganda earn less than 40% of their salaries and
allowances. They borrowed heavily to fund elections and now have to pay
back the loans. Yet to keep their seats, MPs have to return to their
constituents every weekend. Here, they are made to attend to personal
problems of their constituents like paying medical bills and school fees
of their constituents, contributing generously to weddings, funerals
and fund-raising initiatives for churches, clinics, schools and bridges
in their communities.
Consequently, most MPs
are heavily indebted to banks and loan sharks and their pay is deducted
at source. Some earn almost nothing every month. This has left many MPs
too vulnerable economically to exercise oversight over the executive.
Instead they do better colluding with the President to pay their debts
in exchange for voting whatever he wants than seek to hold him to
account. Others depend on bribes from thieving civil servants to
survive.
It is not Museveni’s
cunning that has allowed him to control parliament. Rather, the
incentives created by electoral competition in our circumstances have
undermined the independence of parliament. Next week, I will propose a
solution to this conundrum.
amwenda@independent.co.ug
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