The
recent Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) attack on the Lords Resistance Army
(LRA) camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was certainly the right
thing to do, although the assault itself was ill-timed, poorly planned and
incompetently executed. Before the assault, the Uganda government sought and
obtained a no-objection from the DRC government to enter their territory and
attack LRA camps.
Of
course it was good to involve the DRC government in this effort, although it
risked the secrecy of the mission. LRAs massacres of innocent Congolese
civilians should have made the DRC government develop a vested interest in
joining the operation. However, Uganda sought the no-objection from the DRC
largely to avoid international condemnation that it had invaded that nations
territory.
Over
the years, I have grown increasingly hostile to the idea of respecting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC. That nation has a dysfunctional
state that is unable to exercise effective administrative and military control
over its territory. This dysfunction imposes high costs on DRCs neighbours. For
instance, armed groups hostile to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda assemble
on its territory; they recruit and train rebel armies to launch attacks on
these countries.
In
such circumstances, it is wrong to ask DRCs neighbours to respect its so-called
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Congolese state exercises little or
no sovereignty over most of its territory. This is a major reason armed bands
freely assemble on it and inflict harm on its neighbours. The victims of
Kichwamba in Uganda bear testimony to this. Therefore, the DRC state cannot
claim any territorial integrity.
Indeed,
under international law, nations threatened by armed bands based on a neighbours
territory have a right of hot pursuit; they can enter to attack such armed groups.
However, this principle holds that hot pursuit should not turn into permanent
occupation; it should be specific in its objectives and have a limited time
frame. Yet today, for dysfunctional states like DRC, semi-permanent occupation
should be accepted.
Besides,
these international norms were developed before the costs of dysfunctional
statehood became apparent. We have seen that dysfunctional states do not
threaten their neighbours only. In the case of Afghanistan, the costs were
imposed on a distant nation in form of 9/11. In case of Somalia, the costs are
imposed on international shipping that affects many nations neighbours or not.
These
developments should make us rethink these concepts. Before World War Two,
sovereignty was understood within the meaning of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648
as effective control over ones territory. This facilitated the evolution of
strong states in Europe because it compelled them to build effective military
and administrative systems to demonstrate sovereignty.
After
the world war, sovereignty came to be guaranteed by the international
community. The nations of Africa, born after World War Two, have been the
biggest beneficiaries of this concept but also its losers. No nation can invade
another and either permanently occupy its territory or annex a part of it. This
may have achieved some short-term humanitarian objectives like limiting wars.
But it has disabled the mechanism that in previous times facilitated the
evolution of strong and effective statehood.
Today,
the Congolese state has little incentive to gain and exercise effective control
over its vast territory. For limited control of a few mineral-rich regions, the
ruling elites in Kinshasa can cream off a handsome rent to allow them live
expensive lifestyles, secure that the international community guarantees their
territorial integrity. International norms have thus become the source of this
impunity.
I
have encountered this irresponsible attitude of the Congolese severally at
international conferences. Instead of being concerned with reconstructing their
state to form a formidable presence over its vast territory, they are always
asking the international community to protect them from aggression by Uganda
and Rwanda. How can a large and rich nation like DRC be brought to its knees by
these small neighbours?
The
Congolese elite do not address themselves to the internal dysfunctions that
invite neighbours to invade their country. They are even unconcerned with the
costs imposed on their neighbours by the inability of their state to exercise
effective control over its territory. They do not see that interference in
Congolese affairs is a result, NOT a cause of their states dysfunction. The
worst enemy of Congo is the naive international cartel of good intentions that
cheers them on as they make these outlandish claims.
Thus,
the UN has been concerned with how Congos neighbours have looted its resources.
Again, I hold an unconventional view that Congolese neighbours adversely
affected by its absentee state should be free to use its resources if they
occupy its territory. For example, Uganda invaded Congo in 1998 to fight the
ADF rebels who were based there. Why should I, as a citizen of Uganda, pay
taxes for our military occupation of Congo when it is the dysfunctions of the
Congolese state that forced my government to enter its territory in the first
place?
There
has been a lot of moralising and very little analysis on the problem of DRC.
The mistake for Uganda was to make its citizens pay for the costs of our
occupation of Congo through taxation whereas the benefits of the said loot went
to private profiteers within our military. The Rwandan state was smarter, or so
the UN Panel of Experts claimed. They organised their loot to fatten their
national treasury and from this they financed their occupation of DRC. If this
is true, then Rwanda did the right thing.
In
my earlier days, I used to be one of the moralists on the DRC question. Over
time, I have realised that the carte blanche given to the Congolese elite has
undermined their incentives to build a more effective state. The best solution
for DR Congo now is to remove international guarantees on the Congolese states
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In
the short term, there will be negative humanitarian consequences in form of
war. But it is the only incentive to induce Kinshasa to think seriously about
building effective state capacity. Only an effective state will bring security
and prosperity to the Congolese.
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