The recent Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) attack on
the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
was certainly the right thing to do, although the assault itself was ill-timed,
poorly planned and incompetently executed. Before the assault, the Uganda
government sought and obtained a no-objection from the DRC government to enter
their territory and attack LRA camps.
Of course it was good to involve the DRC government in this
effort, although it risked the secrecy of the mission. LRAs massacres of
innocent Congolese civilians should have made the DRC government develop a
vested interest in joining the operation. However, Uganda sought the
no-objection from the DRC largely to avoid international condemnation that it
had invaded that nations territory.
Over the years, I have grown increasingly hostile to the
idea of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC. That
nation has a dysfunctional state that is unable to exercise effective
administrative and military control over its territory. This dysfunction
imposes high costs on DRCs neighbours. For instance, armed groups hostile to
the governments of Rwanda and Uganda assemble on its territory; they recruit
and train rebel armies to launch attacks on these countries.
In such circumstances, it is wrong to ask DRCs neighbours to
respect its so-called sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Congolese
state exercises little or no sovereignty over most of its territory. This is a
major reason armed bands freely assemble on it and inflict harm on its
neighbours. The victims of Kichwamba in Uganda bear testimony to this.
Therefore, the DRC state cannot claim any territorial integrity.
Indeed, under international law, nations threatened by armed
bands based on a neighbours territory have a right of hot pursuit; they can
enter to attack such armed groups. However, this principle holds that hot
pursuit should not turn into permanent occupation; it should be specific in its
objectives and have a limited time frame. Yet today, for dysfunctional states
like DRC, semi-permanent occupation should be accepted.
Besides, these international norms were developed before the
costs of dysfunctional statehood became apparent. We have seen that
dysfunctional states do not threaten their neighbours only. In the case of
Afghanistan, the costs were imposed on a distant nation in form of 9/11. In
case of Somalia, the costs are imposed on international shipping that affects
many nations neighbours or not.
These developments should make us rethink these concepts.
Before World War Two, sovereignty was understood within the meaning of the
Westphalia Treaty of 1648 as effective control over ones territory. This
facilitated the evolution of strong states in Europe because it compelled them
to build effective military and administrative systems to demonstrate
sovereignty.
After the world war, sovereignty came to be guaranteed by
the international community. The nations of Africa, born after World War Two,
have been the biggest beneficiaries of this concept but also its losers. No
nation can invade another and either permanently occupy its territory or annex
a part of it. This may have achieved some short-term humanitarian objectives like
limiting wars. But it has disabled the mechanism that in previous times
facilitated the evolution of strong and effective statehood.
Today, the Congolese state has little incentive to gain and
exercise effective control over its vast territory. For limited control of a
few mineral-rich regions, the ruling elites in Kinshasa can cream off a
handsome rent to allow them live expensive lifestyles, secure that the
international community guarantees their territorial integrity. International
norms have thus become the source of this impunity.
I have encountered this irresponsible attitude of the
Congolese severally at international conferences. Instead of being concerned
with reconstructing their state to form a formidable presence over its vast
territory, they are always asking the international community to protect them
from aggression by Uganda and Rwanda. How can a large and rich nation like DRC
be brought to its knees by these small neighbours?
The Congolese elite do not address themselves to the
internal dysfunctions that invite neighbours to invade their country. They are
even unconcerned with the costs imposed on their neighbours by the inability of
their state to exercise effective control over its territory. They do not see
that interference in Congolese affairs is a result, NOT a cause of their states
dysfunction. The worst enemy of Congo is the naive international cartel of good
intentions that cheers them on as they make these outlandish claims.
Thus, the UN has been concerned with how Congos neighbours
have looted its resources. Again, I hold an unconventional view that Congolese
neighbours adversely affected by its absentee state should be free to use its
resources if they occupy its territory. For example, Uganda invaded Congo in
1998 to fight the ADF rebels who were based there. Why should I, as a citizen
of Uganda, pay taxes for our military occupation of Congo when it is the
dysfunctions of the Congolese state that forced my government to enter its
territory in the first place?
There has been a lot of moralising and very little analysis
on the problem of DRC. The mistake for Uganda was to make its citizens pay for
the costs of our occupation of Congo through taxation whereas the benefits of
the said loot went to private profiteers within our military. The Rwandan state
was smarter, or so the UN Panel of Experts claimed. They organised their loot
to fatten their national treasury and from this they financed their occupation
of DRC. If this is true, then Rwanda did the right thing.
In my earlier days, I used to be one of the moralists on the
DRC question. Over time, I have realised that the carte blanche given to the
Congolese elite has undermined their incentives to build a more effective
state. The best solution for DR Congo now is to remove international guarantees
on the Congolese states sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In the short term, there will be negative humanitarian
consequences in form of war. But it is the only incentive to induce Kinshasa to
think seriously about building effective state capacity. Only an effective
state will bring security and prosperity to the Congolese.
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