It is very unlikely that Museveni would trade US$ 404m to
the treasury for a private bribe of $50m. Here is why.
Press reports
that Tullow Oil discussed to bribe President Yoweri Museveni with a private
cash payment of US$50 million for his 2011 re-election campaign in order to
circumvent paying capital gains tax worth US$ 404 million have generated heated
debate in the country. Although the emails refer to an inside suggestion among
company executives, Museveni’s critics, hungry for any mud to smear on him, now
claim that the President actually took the bribe.
Yet this is
not the case. For the most part, Museveni has overriding control over the
treasury even though there are constant struggles to restrain him. Like we saw
in the last campaign, he has the political leverage to withdraw large sums of
public funds to inject into his campaigns.
He may, as he did in 2011, mask this
expenditure in form of payments to LCs, compensation of veterans, financing for
agricultural extension services, building electricity lines, resurfacing some
roads etc. However, many of these activities are conveniently employed during
the campaigns to bolster his electoral fortunes.
Therefore,
Museveni cannot take a bribe from oil companies to help them avoid their tax
obligations to the state. This is not because he is the paragon of virtue but
because of the way he has structured his relationship with the state. The
President sees Uganda as his country, a father in charge of the family estate.
I have argued
before that he has to some extent personalised the state even though this is
under constant contestation. For the most part, he treats the national treasury
as his personal bank account and withdraws public funds to serve his political
purposes. It is therefore illogical that Museveni would trade a tax windfall to
the [his] treasury for a smaller private bribe.
Besides
Museveni has little appetite for personal material aggrandisement. He has very
simple tastes even though he prefers the grandeur of an emperor. Therefore, he
is not the type to be looking for money to buy precious real estate in London
or to invest in the New York stock exchange. To this extend Museveni is largely
an honest public servant.
He is contented with his two ranches in Rwakitura and
Kisozi, seeing them as the epitome of material achievement. This fact was
brought home at the funeral of Eriya Kategaya. In rejecting the claim that
Kategaya died poor, Museveni counter argued that Kategaya had two farms in his
village with some cows on them.
If our
President had grand ambitions for private wealth acquisition, he would have
been more successful in fostering the creation of public wealth. Just assume a
President who steals money from the public purse and invests profitably on the
London stock exchange or prime real estate in Hong Kong for his private gain.
Such a thief-president would probably closely monitor the performance of his
stock and the property market. It is very possible that this experience would
give him the insight on how to make smart public investments.
This is best
reflected in the private fortunes of the leading Kenyan political families –
Kenyatta, Moi, Kibaki, Njonjo and others – and equally the public investments
the state in Kenya has made. The state in Kenya owns shares in some of the
largest and most profitable private businesses in Africa – Safaricom, Kenya
Airways, KCB, Uchumi, Kengen, etc. It is possible the state in Kenya invests
wisely because its leaders are investors as well.
This is not
to say that Museveni is not interested in money. Rather he is interested in
economically unproductive albeit politically profitable uses of money. For
example, our president does not see money as an end in itself but only as a
means to an end. The end is political power and the influence it gives him to
achieve his goals – personal and social. So our president’s interest in money
is not geared to realise an economic but a “political return” on investment.
This is
because Museveni sees money as an important political resource. If he takes
public funds, it will not be to buy a holiday home at the French Riviera but to
rent political support. This means that if he needs money, it must be in the
hands of the state whose institutions he has sufficient control over to ensure
it is used to effectively to reproduce his political power.
Therefore,
the forms of corruption that Museveni indulges in are not personal but
political. He may hire 71 ministers, appoint 120 advisors, create 114
districts, establish 150 commissions and semi-autonomous government bodies and
retain a large retinue of assistants. This is political patronage. He may also
equip the army beyond national security needs – if only to realize his dream of
imperial grandeur. Today, with Ugandan troops stabilising Congo, pacifying
Somalia, engaged in South Sudan, this dream has come true.
However, all
these expenditures allow him to perform some governmental functions, sometimes
to achieve a measure of internal social integration within our ethnically
diverse society, maintain stability; but it also helps him hold and reproduce
power.
However, although this form of political corruption privileges trade in
private goods among elites (official jobs and unofficial opportunities to
profit through corruption) at the expense of public goods and services to the
citizen, it is largely, if not entirely, paid for through the public purse, not
private funds. Museveni therefore needs public, not private funds to retain his
power and can therefore not cheat the taxpayer by colluding with Tullow to
circumvent its obligations to the state.
What actually
happened? I suspect that someone close to the president lied to Tullow. He
probably asked for US$50 million claiming it is for the president’s campaign
when he wanted it for himself. The real story is: who was this person? That is
the question.
1 comment:
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