Why South Korea succeeded where Uganda failed
A common
argument to explain (the better term would be to “caricature”) post
independence failures in Africa is always in comparison to East Asia. It
is often argued, for example, that by 1960, Ghana and South Korea had
the same per capita income of roughly US$100. Yet 50 years later, South
Korea’s per capita income is US$ 32,000 while Ghana’s is US$ 3,100.
Therefore, the conclusion goes, there was gross mismanagement of Ghana’s
potential in comparison to effective management of South Korea’s
opportunities. The often unsaid but certainly underlying thesis behind
such comparisons is that there is something inherently wrong with
Africa. That unsaid “something” is racial; an inherent incapacity for
self government.
Yet the
focus on per capita income ignores the most salient ingredients that
influence developmental outcomes. For lack of access to detailed
information about Ghana, I will substitute it with Uganda which enjoyed
an almost closer level of per capita income as South Korea in 1960.
By 1960,
South Korea had been in existence as a nation for over 600 years with a
strong and centralised state, a common language and a shared
consciousness of nationhood. There had been a brief interruption of
Japanese colonialism from 1910 to 1945 (35 years). Therefore, the
challenge facing Sigman Rhee and later Park Chang Hee, the military
rulers in Seoul, was not nation or state building but economic
reconstruction after the devastation brought about by the war with what
later became North Korea. On the other hand, Ghana by 1960 had been born
three years earlier, Uganda two years later. The immediate challenge
facing Kwame Nkrumah and Milton Obote was to mould a nation from tens of
disparate nations and tribes with different languages, cultures and
sometimes hostility to each other.
Secondly,
South Korea was endowed with rich institutional traditions based on
meritocratic recruitment into the bureaucracy through an intensely
competitive Public Administration entry exam known as the haengsi. By
1960, this tradition had been in place for 450 years. It allowed
government to promote people from within the ranks than hiring from
outside the bureaucracy. Japanese colonialism had actually relied on
South Koreans to man the civil service. This gave it vital institutional
memory, avoided resistance that comes with change in leadership,
ensured supply of high quality expertise and a strong espirit de corp –
assets that are intangible but valuable.
On the
other hand, up until 1957, there were hardly any Ugandans in the top
civil service jobs, the first one appointed to a top position being
Yusuf Lule in 1958. Although the British had introduced rich civil
service traditions of meritocratic recruitment and promotion, few
Africans were integrated into this culture and only in the last days of
colonialism. The majority of Africans who served the colonial state were
clerks and messengers. With the departure of colonialists at
independence, every African with a good education but without experience
and skills became a permanent secretary, a commissioner or head of a
large public enterprise.
For
example, in 1960, Uganda’s entire public service excluding nurses,
police and all but a few hundred teachers was a little more than 5,000
strong in a country of more than six million people. Out of the top 10
percent of the civil service jobs categorised as “professional”,
Ugandans occupied only 10 percent i.e. 90 percent were non-nationals –
Europeans and Asians. Then out of the next tier 30 percent categorised
as “technical” jobs, only 40 percent were Ugandans; and out of third
tier 30 percent categorised as “sub-technical”, 65 percent were
Ugandans. The rest of the jobs, categorised as clerical, were largely
occupied by Ugandans.
This
nature of power under colonial rule shaped the character of post
colonial politics. The nationalist struggle for independence was fought
to get African-Ugandans to participate in the management of the country.
Yet, although this demand was understandable, the country did not have
experienced and skilled people to take over immediately. Obote resisted
attempts at rapid Africanisation and relied on inherited European and
Asian expertise to sustain administrative competences. This allowed him
to expand service delivery without undermining quality. But it also
caused his downfall. Thus, when Idi Amin came in, to build his
popularity, he met popular demands for rapid Africanisation by chasing
away Indians and Europeans thereby precipitating economic and
institutional collapse.
Economists
have shown that for a country to avoid violent conflicts and sustain a
reasonable rate of growth, it needs to have a critical mass of its
citizens with primary and secondary school education – about 50 and 30
percent. By 1960, primary school enrolment in South Korea was 60 percent
and secondary school 36 percent. Meanwhile, 12 percent of South Korean
men and four percent of the women aged 18-21 were either in university
or high technical institutions.
In fact by
1930, South Korea had a large supply of technical skills even in the
remotest parts of the country. Technology and its application were
widely diffuse in the society. With a large army of artisans at every
level, there were many small cottage industries producing various
value-added goods in the far flung parts of the country. These latter
formed the human infrastructure to support industrialisation. All they
needed to do was upgrade their skills and join industries producing
automobiles, electronics and other industrial consumer good.
In Uganda,
on the other hand, primary school enrolment (P1 to P6) in 1961 was a 12
percent. Junior Secondary and Senior Secondary (S1 to S4) was less than
one percent. And total enrolment in S5 to S6 was a mere 323 students.
There were only 450 students in technical schools of all levels. Yet in
spite of these miserable numbers, Uganda was among the most educated
nations in Africa. By 1950, there were only two universities in Africa
south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo – Makerere in Uganda and
Ibadan in Nigeria. Consequently, at the time of independence, for
example, Tanzania had half a dozen university graduates, Rwanda and
Burundi had none at all and Congo (Zaire) had less than 10.
At both
the level of internal capacity to manage complex modern institutions and
at the level of education, there were very limited skills. The belief
that under colonial rule services were good is misleading because the
services were very narrowly focused, like under apartheid South Africa,
to serve a very small population of expatriates. After independence,
there was an attempt to rapidly expand these services to serve the wider
African population. As a result, the state became overdeveloped in
function yet it was underdeveloped in capacity; so its reach was far
beyond its grasp. This is what led to the many failures that we African
elites cry so much about.
Many
African elites argue that blaming colonialism for our failures ignores
the role our governments have played in post colonial mismanagement of
our nations. This is partly true and I used to make this argument. The
depredations of Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, Siad Barre, etc cannot
really be entirely blamed on colonialism. Yet the pendulum of this
argument swung from one extreme (of blaming everything on colonialism)
to another extreme (of blaming everything on the post colonial
administrations). Both extremes are wrong.
“Men make
their own history,” Karl Marx wrote on the military coup by Louis
Napoleon in 1951, “but they do not make it just as they please; they do
not make in it circumstances chosen by themselves, but in circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past.” To ignore the
structural constraints post independence leaders encountered has been
one of the biggest weaknesses of attempts by those who examine the
agency (post independence governments) that failed to deliver
transformation. It seems that at independence, Africa suffered from over
expectation.
Could post
independence governments in Africa have performed better? Perhaps, but
at a price; they should have aimed at preserving their limited capacity;
using it only sparingly. Instead, most governments in Africa moved fast
to elaborate public functions. Botswana avoided this mistake perhaps
because it had had an almost absentee colonial state. This could have
reduced the demands for rapid africanisation. But acting like Botswana
would have been a purely technical response to what was actually a
burning political problem.
The
nationalist struggle for independence emerged to challenge legally
sanctioned exclusion of Africans from state power outside of traditional
institutions in colonial Africa. That was its fuel. Upon independence,
the first demand therefore was rapid africanisation. Although
technically disastrous, it was politically popular. The second demand
was derived from the first. Africans wanted to take public services to
the wider population. Few governments would have survived by resisting
this demand.
Political
pressure for africanisation undermined the meritocratic systems of
external recruitment and internal promotion that allowed the civil
service to uphold its high standards. Rapid elaboration of functions
without existing capacity made a bad situation worse. What was
politically right was technically disastrous. And in our ethnically
heterogeneous polities, promoting social inclusion – even on the face of
things – was more politically desirable than sustaining technical
competence. The problem is that it eroded competence and allowed
cronyism and corruption to flourish. Politics is costly and Africa had
to pay that price.
Many
African elites focus on technical failures in Africa and ignore the
political compromises that brought that failure. In other words, the
price of political compromise was technical failure. It is possible that
if such compromises had not been struck, many states in Africa would
have collapsed under the weight of civil war. It is remarkable that
African leaders who inherited fictions of states left behind by colonial
rule were successful at creating a common national consciousness. This
has sustained the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these
nations. Today, few states in Africa have fallen apart like Somalia. In
others, the state may not be omnipresent yet, but the concept of
nationhood has gained a lot of ground.
This
brings us to another element that set the stage for success in South
Korea and for failure in Africa. South Korea is a homogeneous society.
Consequently, its politics is less factionalised and fosters greater
capacity for political consensus-building on many policy issues. Most
African countries are heterogeneous with different ethnic and religious
factions vying for influence. It is, therefore, difficult to build a
consensus on anything. To make matters worse, the dominant development
ideology of the 1960s was for governments to take control of the
commanding heights of the economy in order to foster African
participation. Yet states in Africa were the least suited for such
strategies because of their internal fractionalisation. Thus, every
attempt at state control tended to place public resources in the hands
of one group – or at least create a perception thereof.
This
generated secondary contestations. All too often, the excluded groups
were able to effectively contest their exclusion – real or imagined –
hence leading to coups, civil wars, expanding political patronage in
form of large cabinets and other appointments to create an appearance of
ethnic, regional or religious balance. All these political compromises
imposed high costs on the state’s capacity to sustain growth, seek and
realise development or build technical capacity to deliver on their
promises.
After
prolonged economic failure, many governments in Africa adopted liberal
economic policies. They sold public enterprises, disbanded state
monopolies and removed the dead hand of the state and its politics from
business. Today, most economies of the nations of Africa are growing
rapidly. It seems to me that in ethnically factionalised nations, the
best economic policies are those that favour the free market.
Today,
there are many contests over every deal, tender or contract given out by
NSSF (which is controlled by government). However, companies like MTN,
Uganda Breweries, Crane Bank, etc give out multimillion dollar loans or
tenders without parliament intervening and the press screaming. Thus,
while many of Uganda’s chattering classes vigorously resist free market
policies, citing how state involvement in China and South Korea has been
successful, they ignore that the heterogeneity of our societies is bad
for state involvement in the economy.
One can
argue that my arguments are an excuse for governmental corruption,
incompetence and nepotism. If we accept my reasoning, we may become
complacent with the weaknesses that we need to overcome. I accept this
counter argument with the humility of experience. However, elites in
Africa possess overblown expectations. We expect our states of deliver
like states in Sweden and Norway. Actually they cannot. It is good to
have dreams of grandeur but it is important to temper them with
realistic expectations.
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