Given Museveni’s long rule and potential for family succession, is Uganda now vulnerable to an `Arab Spring’
I argued
in this column last week that Africa has almost similar structural
conditions as the Middle East on the eve of the Arab Spring – sustained
economic growth for almost two decades, investment in mass education,
penetration of modern communication technology like mobile phones and
internet, a youth bulge alongside their joblessness and social and
political frustrations among the middle class.
A couple
of readers wrote to me saying Uganda is almost similar to the Middle
East: it has a long-serving president with potential for a family
succession; an increasingly educated and urbanised yet unemployed youth;
a dominant ruling party backed by the military; a government
increasingly seen as corrupt, nepotistic and incompetent by a large
cross-section of the population especially the more educated and exposed
urban elites.
My view is
that Uganda today is a meeting ground of contradictory realities. On
top of the above realities, political contestation and participation are
high; every general election has been highly competitive even
generating a real possibility that President Yoweri Museveni could lose
it. This was especially so in 2001 and 2006. Uganda has a very high
anti-incumbency bias: Over 65 percent of all Members of Parliament (MPs)
and local council officials don’t get re-elected in every election.
Contrast this with the USA where 90 percent of all incumbent legislators
are assured of re-election.
Uganda
also has a fairly free media (in spite of a few hitches), a vibrant
civil society (even if it is foreign aid funded) and highly vocal
opposition political parties (even though weak organisationally). Also,
the NRM as a revolutionary movement enjoys deeper penetration of
society than ordinary political parties. Coupled with this, there is a
near constant cooptation of elites that makes the system flexible
enough to adapt to new realities by accommodating emergent demands and
thereby reducing the risk of revolution.
From the
above therefore, one can say that the 2011 election seemed to have
changed the direction of Uganda’s politics. First, Museveni’s percentage
vote had declined in every election; from 75 percent in 1996 to 69
percent in 2001 and further to 59 percent in 2006. His absolute vote had
also fallen from 5.1million in 2001 to 4.1 million in 2006. This had
created hope that at least there was a chance the president could be
democratically removed. However, in 2011, his support went up by 10
percentage points – to 68 percent and his absolute vote increased from
4.1m to 5.4 million.
The
opposition in Uganda missed this changing dynamic in spite of several
indicators that the political ground was shifting. All previous general
elections had been preceded by defections from the NRM to the
opposition. In 1996 it was Paul Ssemogerere and his allies in the
Democratic Party. In 2001, it was Kizza Besigye with the firebrands of
NRM. Then 2006 saw the largest exodus of key pillars from NRM to the
opposition – Eriya Kategaya, Mugisha Muntu, Amanya Mushega, Bidandi
Ssali, Richard Kaijuka, David Pulkol, John Kazora, Miria Matembe, Sarah
Kiyingi and Mathew Rukikaire.
Yet the
period preceding 2011 saw a reverse trend as key opposition politicians
like Chris Rwakasisi, Badru Wegulo, Jacob Oulanyah, Osindek Wangor,
Henry Mayiga, John Butime, Alex Onzima, Agnes Okiror (former woman MP
for Kumi0, Rhoda Acen (former woman MP for Amuria) etc joined the ruling
party. People like Kategaya, Kaijuka, Matembe, Rukikaire, Mushega who
had supported the FDC directly and indirectly were now absent from the
campaign to topple Museveni.
Yet
Museveni’s victory in 2011 was double-edged. On the one hand it seems to
have demoralised many opposition supporters thereby making them
cynical and apathetic about politics. Indeed, it may even have made
some join the NRM in resignation – “if we cannot beat them, let us join
them”. Yet on the other hand, this defeat also seems to have
radicalised Museveni critics who now believe there is almost no
possibility of changing government democratically. This radicalised
group, largely led by Dr. Kizza Besigye, has now opted for civil
protest to promote regime change.
Therefore,
a tendency towards an Arab Spring exists in Uganda but largely as a
marginal force. For it to become mainstream Museveni needs to make
grievous mistakes that create prolonged economic hardship (just like sky
the rocketing inflation we saw last year) followed by reduced economic
growth. Adverse conditions like these would play into the hands of
those seeking to lead social unrest, forcing government to respond with
increased repression. This would most likely harden its opponents
while drawing many more Ugandans unto the streets.
For now,
the chances of prolonged economic decline and repression seem low but
possible. If Museveni regains the economic initiative, controls
inflation and gets growth back to above 6.5 percent, he may stave off
mass unrest at the price of producing more restless, unemployed yet
educated urban youth. Under such good economic circumstances, political
frustration would continually be mitigated by the availability of many
avenues to voice dissent – newspapers, radio and television talk shows,
civil society and political party activism. Thus, change may have to
come within the existing political arrangements rather than by
dismantling them first.
Therefore,
while one cannot rule out the possibility or probability of an Arab
Spring kind of insurrection in Uganda, one also has to be more sceptical
about it. Yet Besigye seems to have concluded the opposite: That he
needs to bring about change by shifting from FDC to For God and Country
(4GC). It seems to me that the most prudent approach is to improve the
organisational effectiveness of FDC and move its main thrust from the
fanatical fringe of the political debate to the political centre in
order to appeal to a larger body of Ugandans.
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