Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Why oil revenues will harm us
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Why oil revenues will harm us
Friday, October 23, 2009
Give Afghan warlords a chance
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
What Uganda’s protests tell us
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Is Uganda’s press freedom a myth?
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Why Rwanda wins world prizes
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Museveni Vs Mengo: who won?
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
NSSF: Govt, stop babysitting us
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
Give Darfur war a chance
2011 polls: Is EC playing foul on voter register?
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Why Uganda has no citizens
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Colonialism reclaiming Africa?
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
A tale of two presidents, two nations and two revolutions
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Why are our politicians corrupt?
Inside the Umeme power tariff scandal
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Our Reply to Obama
On his recent visit to Ghana, U.S. President Barack Obama condemned war, corruption, tribalism, and all the other ills that have bedeviled our continent. Many Africans in Africa and the diaspora were moved by the speech, as were many Africa observers in the West. The speech captivated imaginations because it appealed to people's basic common sense.
That is where its positive contribution ends.
Rather inconveniently, all the attention Obama's speech has gotten disproves his opening remark: "We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans." It is not the speech of an African leader on the future of the continent that is exciting debate in the media and finding space on the blogs; it is a speech by the U.S. president. This very simple contradiction reveals the world's collective tendency to seek Africa's solutions from the West.
Beyond its many good phrases and populist appeals, Obama's speech did not deviate fundamentally from the views of other Western leaders I have read throughout my lifetime -- on aid, on civil wars, on corruption, or on democracy. Obama repackaged the same old views in less diplomatic language. He had the courage to be more explicit on Africa's ills because, due to his African heritage, Obama can say as he wishes without sounding racist -- a fear that constrains other Western leaders when talking about Africa.
Even so, Obama said nothing new. He assumes that African countries have been mismanaged because leaders on the continent are bad men who make cold hearted choices. His solution is thus to extend moral pleas for them to rule better. Yet it is not the individual behavior of Africa's rulers that demands our closest attention, destructive as that behavior may be. It is the structure of incentives those leaders confront -- incentives that help determine the choices they make.
Using this logic, we can start to ask more-useful questions. If the choices made by Africa's rulers have destroyed their economies, under what conditions can they develop a vested interest in growth-promoting policies? If Africans are going to war much more often than other human beings on the planet, what causes them to do so? When is peace more attractive than military combat?
Governing is not about making simplistic choices on who is right and who is wrong. It requires making complicated trade-offs, some of which might be costly in the short term. Take negotiated conflict settlements, for example, a policy that has stabilized Liberia and Sierra Leone after the two countries' brutal civil wars. That same policy wouldn't have worked in 1994 in Rwanda, where it would have produced an unstable power-sharing arrangement between victims of genocide and their executioners. The lesson: We cannot have one blueprint for all of Africa's problems. Even "good" moral decisions, such as those so often urged upon us by the West, can be bad sometimes.
Obama assumes that the fundamental challenge facing Africa is the lack of democracy and the checks and balances that come with it. But how does he explain why authoritarian Rwanda fights corruption and delivers public services to its citizens much better than its democratic neighbor, Uganda? In fact, the Ugandan brand of democracy has spawned corruption and incompetence more than it has helped combat them. The country's ethnic politics makes patronage and corruption more electorally profitable than delivering services.
Obama's preferred models of successful development, Singapore and South Korea, were not democratic when they rose to prominence. His proposals on ending corruption -- "forensic accounting, automating services strengthening hot lines and protecting whistle-blowers" -- are technocratic in nature. But the real challenge is how to give Africa's rulers a vested interest in fighting corruption. In most of Africa today, corruption is the way the system works -- not the way it fails.
The lesson for Obama is that Africa is likely to get better with less meddling in its affairs by the West, not more -- whether that meddling is through aid, peacekeeping, or well-written speeches. Africa needs space to make mistakes and learn from them. The solutions for Africa have to be shaped and articulated by Africans, not outsiders. Obama needs to listen to Africans much more, not lecture them using the same old teleprompter.
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
How elections can undermine democracy
How elections can undermine democracy
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Why Obama is not our saviour
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Jackson triumphed over media
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Education reforms Uganda needs
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Iran reporting a travesty of journalism
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
How to remove hyenas from the meat market
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
2009/10 budget good but will it deliver?
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Why Kagame succeeds where others fail
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
The hope and tragedy of Uganda
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Can’t have democracy without citizens
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Will Zuma follow Mugabe or Mandela?
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Dictatorships don’t serve the people; they give privileges to their cronies
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Why Uganda’s democracy fails
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Who is sacrificing for Uganda?
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
CAN MUSEVENI PRACTISES BE TRUSTED?
“Coming to your problems, I would like to touch on your problem of electricity load shading – a situation in which you have electricity for some hours after which it is taken to another place. These are the cumulative effects of what we have been going through. Our small power station at Jinja was capable of generating 150 megawatts when it was built in 1954 and when the population of Uganda was four and a half million people. By the time we came to government in 1986, its capacity had declined to 120 megawatts and the population of Uganda is now 17 million.
Can Museveni’s promises be trusted?
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Lesson for Uganda from the international financial crisis
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Why Faith Mwondha should go
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
what has Museveni sacrificed ?
Friday, April 3, 2009
To check graft, focus on results
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
WHY REDTAPE INCREASES GRAFT.
Why red tape increases graft
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
The trouble with Uganda’s democracy
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
YOU WANT FREEDOM? IT IS EXPENSIVE !
You want freedom? It is expensive
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Farewell Republic of Uganda, welcome Rwakitura kingdom
FARWELL UGANDA WELCOME KINGDOM OF RWAKITURA.
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Why Museveni pretends and Kagame acts
WHY KAGAME ACTS AND MUSEVENI PRETENDS
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
UGANDAN OPPOSITION MUST SPEAK TO OUR APIRATIONS.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
NRM AT 23 FROM HOPE TO DESPAIR.
Museveni walking same path of African dictators
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
To check graft, focus on results
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
WHEN CHECK ON GRAFT INCREASES IT
It is good to learn and borrow from the good practices of others; so Africa does not need to re-invent the wheel. But it is also important to appreciate the unique social configurations that shape our policies and therefore adjust foreign systems to our circumstances or introduce completely different institutional innovations to address our problems. Uganda has myriad institutions to “check†abuses in public procurement: PPDA, IGG, Attorney General’s Chambers, contract committees in every ministry and public body, parliamentary oversight committees. Yet rather than check corruption, they tend to accentuate it.
Many studies show that corruption per se does not impede economic growth and development; rather, it is the specific form it takes that shapes its developmental impact. I feel bad to admit this truth because corruption is a morally repugnant thing. But be that as it may, in 1995, ex-president Roh Tae Woo of South Korea was arrested for corruption. He admitted to accumulating a personal fortune of US$ 650m while in office. This was just a tip of an iceberg. It turned out that there had been a lot of corruption in South Korea during its period of industrial transformation.
So why didn’t corruption impede transformation in South Korea and Indonesia but destroyed the economy of Marshal Mobutu’s Zaire? New York University professor, William Easterly in his book The Elusive Quest for Growth argues that corruption is corrosive when it is decentralised (i.e. when there are many bribe takers and their imposition of bribes is not coordinated among them). However, corruption is less negative when it is centralised (i.e. a government leader organises all corruption activity in the economy and determines the share of each official in the ill-gotten proceeds).
Easterly uses the common pool problem: multiple roadblocks by soldiers in Mobutu’s Zaire. Each soldier at the roadblock is an individual predator, without taking into account the effect of his actions on other soldier-predators. The wealth of the travellers is a common resource that all of the independent thieves try to appropriate. Easterly argues that the bribes demanded will be higher as each soldier-thief tries to get as much revenue from the hapless traveller as possible before other soldier-thieves get it. Under such circumstances, the total “theft rate†will be higher.
This is the problem with corruption in public procurement in Uganda. The myriad bodies to check corruption in public procurement in Uganda are the equivalent of soldiers at roadblocks in Zaire; we have many bribe takers whose theft is not coordinated among them. Thus, an investor awarded a contract by the ministry’s contract committee runs the risk of losing it on a petition to PPDA if his rival supplies a better bribe there. Equally, the one who has been approved by PPDA could lose it if their rival petitions the IGG. This creates a lot of uncertainty over rights to property granted by government hence negative incentives for investment. This is one reason why increasingly, only Kamikaze investors look up our country for investment.
Therefore, the only way an investor can be secure with the allocation of a given right is by trying to bring on board all bodies with power over his/her tender: Attorney General’s Chambers, IGG, PPDA, the ministry contracts committee, State House, parliament, etc. The transaction costs (the time and effort taken in coordinating all these bodies to arrive at a common agreement) of security on a common agreement among all these institutions are very high. And since each of these centres of power demand a cut from the deal, the financial costs inflict a heavy toll on the hapless investor. That is why tendering deals that meet all procedural rules in Uganda are very expensive.
Now, let us remove these decentralised layers of control and introduce a highly centralised form of corruption (Gen. Suharto’s Indonesia). Easterly argues that in a corrupt Mafioso, one leader seeks to maximise the take from the corruption network as a whole. This leader has a vested interest in his victim’s prosperity because he knows that stealing too much will cause his victim to take evasive action, a factor that will lower the total bribe collections. So the bribe “tax-rate†will be lower at all the collection centres in order to maximise the total take of the system. Such corruption is less damaging to growth. The lesson is that for corruption to have less damage, you need a structure of incentives that makes corrupt leaders solicitous of their victim’s prosperity. Removing multi centres of control in poor countries seems the solution.
With the decentralised corruption we see in Uganda, many public officials are corrupt but the state is incompetent to apprehend them. The likelihood that someone will be punished for corrupt behaviour is positively related to the strength of state enforcement and negatively related to the number of corrupt officials. This means that even if the state prosecutes some corrupt officials, the likelihood of being caught is very low; there are too many corrupt officials from whom to choose when the state decides to prosecute. So, the thieves steal with impunity.
There can be a legitimate argument that these multiple institutions of control over public procurement merely reflect the actual fragmentation of power within Uganda’s polity. In other words, they are consequences, not causes of decentralised power, and with it decentralised corruption. This means that even if we removed them at an official level, effective power over procurement would remain decentralised. Informal factions within the state and inside State House itself would vie for tenders in similar fashion. But this should only make us think of the right institutional innovation to achieve better, albeit incremental change in public procurement.
amwenda@independent.co.ug